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in order that the reader may -benefit from the writer's discussion of the
various principles enunciated in numerous leading decisions. While this is
a minor omission, it is a convenience which will be sorely missed by military
counsel and judges.
In sum, however, the faults to be found with Military Evidence are
greatly outweighed by its sound exposition of the principles unique to
military practice and those generally applied in all common law courts. It
is to be commended to military lawyers everywhere, and I daresay that the
armed services would benefit greatly if they required its perusal during the
various special training courses which their attorneys are required to attend.
CABELL F. COBBS*
THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. By Robert A. Leflar. Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959. Pp. lxxii, 467. $13.50.
This book is the outgrowth of a project started by the author some
twenty-five years ago. The origin was an undertaking to prepare and
Arkansas annotation to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Professor
Leflar soon discovered, as did so many other state annotators, that except
in the most unsatisfactory way, this was an impossible task. Case after
case just could not be lined up as "in accord" or "contra" the Restatement
blackletter. They would fit only vaguely or tangentially into the neat
moulds of Professor Beale's conceptualism. To be sure, cases were decided
for one or the other side in the litigation, but opinions were often muddled,
illogical and confused. Professor Leflar was unhappy with his project and
had the good sense to throw it up. Instead, he wrote a small book in the
nature of a treatise on the Arkansas law of Conflict of Laws in an attempt
to give a more accurate description of the law in his state. He then dis-
covered, to use his own words that "on a subject like Conflict of Laws .. .
no one state's law is complete within itself; the law is made up of a national
mass of cases and writings including locally binding precedents, the latter
being in general locally distinguishable on their facts from almost any later
case that may arise."'
Within the limitations of space which Professor Leflar has imposed
upon himself, it seems to this reviewer that he has handled subtle and
difficult problems with extraordinary skill and lucidity. As an example, his
treatment of the problem of equitable conversion in the Conflict of Laws
may be cited.2 He points out that some of the few cases on the matter have
taken the position that the doctrine of equitable conversion is a rule of
internal property or other law designed to attain certain local results which
have nothing to do with choice of law problems, as for instance to carry out
the intention and desire of a testator.' Where it is a question of its conver-
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sion into personality, unless the court applies the law of the situs of the
land, unfortunate results may be brought about. If it is a question of title
to the land that is involved, any other rule might be self-defeating since the
situs has the last word. If it is a question of inheritance taxation, two states
may exact a tax as where the vendor's interests in a contract for the sale of
land in another state is treated as personal property and taxed at the domicile
of the decedent but treated as realty at the situs and taxed there.4
The author's treatment of the general problem of characterization in
the Conflict of Laws is erudite and sophisticated. He favors the rule that
the forum applies its own qualifications and classifications in characterizing
a legal problem. He points out the difficulty and circuity in attempting to
apply to the characterization problem the law of the state governing the
substantive rights of the parties. Frequently that law cannot be determined
until the process of characterization has been completed. In any event,
when a state adopts a choice of law rule, presumably it does so for some
reason either of administrative convenience or of policy. This reason is
ignored, and the policy subverted if the law of some other jurisdiction charac-
terizes the terms in which the rule is cast. Thus, if Connecticut, as the
forum, has the rule that the place of the alleged wrong governs tort liability
but the "proper" law is applied to contract problems-say the place of the
most important contacts-it loses control if the law of Arkansas, California
or New York, as the case may be, determines whether the issue involved
is one of tort or contract.
In a work of this scope, one can always find something about which
to complain. For example, I do not always see eye to eye with the author
on his interpretation of particular cases. This is not because I think he
has read them inaccurately, but because he will place a different emphasis
on the rationale or select different parts of the opinion as the "key". Thus,
he cites the New York case of Herzog v. Stern for the proposition that the
problem of enforcement of the survival statute of the place of tort was
characterized by the New York court as "one of the distribution of the
deceased tortfeasor's estate" and therefore governed by the law of the
domicile.6 He then explains a California case7 as holding that the survival
statute is "procedural and not substantive" so that the forum's statute will
govern.
But in Judge Lehman's somewhat fuzzy opinion in Herzog, he re-
peatedly declared, presumably as the basis of his decision, that the court
was "without jurisdiction" because neither the common law nor any statute
of New York provided for an action for personal injury against the personal
representative of a deceased tortfeasor.8 This is not a situation where the
court decides the case by applying its own substantive law. It merely de-
cides not to decide it because it has no jurisdiction. Certainly this is not
res judicata of the merits. If the plaintiff can find an administrator of the
decedent's estate in a jurisdiction which has a survival statute or where the
tort was committed, it is hard to believe that the New York decision would
be a bar.
4 In re Plasterer's Estate, 49 Wash. (2d) 339, 301 P. (2d) 539 (1956).
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In the California case, Justice Traynor's opinion also was not alto-
gether clear. The decision applied the California survival statute to an
Arizona accident between two California parties. It is true that at one point
the opinion appears to adopt a procedural characterization. But a more
plausible explanation appears in the following language: "When, as in the
present case, all the parties were resident of this state, and the estate of the
deceased tortfeasor is being administered in this state, plaintiff's right to
prosecute their cause of action is governed by the laws of this state relating
to administration of estates. ' Again the court said, "the problem here is
whether the causes of action that these plaintiffs had against Pullen [the
deceased] before his death survive as liabilities of his estate."'"
But these points are niceties on which disagreement is not surprising.
Whatever major criticims that could be made of the author's work are
mostly those of inadequacy, e.g., his neglect of the "proper law" for de-
termining tort liability and his two pages on Erie v. Tompkins. But it is
hardly fair to criticize an author for not writing a book he never intended
to write. The author here set himself the task of preparing a short treatise
outlining the major principles, rules and policies of the Conflict of Laws-
not an exhaustive and comprehensive treatment of the subject.
Occasionally Professor Leflar says something which I do not understand,
but I attribute this to my own limitations rather than to his. He also raises
questions which I cannot answer with any degree of confidence. But here
again, my students do that each year, and although it is sometimes dis-
couraging it seems to happen more frequently as the years go by. I like to
think that it is not because the students are brighter, but that I learn more
and more what I do not know.
It is frequently said by teachers of Conflicts of Laws that there is
more confusion here than in other branches of the law. There is some
plausibility to the proposition. Those who deal with this subject do have
confusion in two dimensions-that of the substantive law involved and that
in the area of Conflicts. It is close to the department of utter confusion.
There is not only the problem of jurisdiction (judicial, legislative and
executive and/or administrative) but those of choice of law, compounded by
the renvoi and characterization. Straight thinking in all these areas places
an extraordinary strain upon legal scholarship. In so far as this is true, the
author of this book stands up admirably under the strain.
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